Another June 6th

[Abilene Slim SASS 81783]

The battle of Midway ended June 6th 1942, having dealt a devastating blow to the Japanese Fleet.

[Subdeacon Joe]

The real tragedy of Midway is that the losses of ships, men, and aircraft by the Japanese pretty much made it impossible for Japan to win in the Pacific. Effectively, the war was over. It just took three more years to wind down.

[Abilene Slim SASS 81783]

The real tragedy of Midway is that the losses of ships, men, and aircraft by the Japanese pretty much made it impossible for Japan to win in the Pacific. Effectively, the war was over. It just took three more years to wind down.

What I always thought interesting was Yamamoto's prediction that he could run wild thru the Pacific for about 6 months, but things would go downhill from after that. December 7th to June 6th -- pretty dang close.

 

I sometimes wonder how the Pacific war would have gone had he survived past 1943.

[Chantry]

What I always thought interesting was Yamamoto's prediction that he could run wild thru the Pacific for about 6 months, but things would go downhill from after that. December 7th to June 6th -- pretty dang close.

 

I sometimes wonder how the Pacific war would have gone had he survived past 1943.

 

It is probable he could have strung the war out for another 6 months to a year, but the end result would have been the same, even if the path taken to get there might have been different. There was no way that Japanese could even come close to matching our output of ships and planes and with the submarines very successful campaign against the Japanese merchant fleet, the Japanese were rapidly running out of the ability to import anything and much of the remaining Japanese fleet ended up stuck in port due to lack of oil.

[Hacker, SASS #55963]

The Battle of Midway was a great waste of fuel oil for the Japanese Navy. Yamamoto's main body did nothing.

Nor did any of the other main surface combatant groups. Except for Cruiser Division 7 which succeeded in getting one CA sunk and another seriously damaged.

 

As for the loss of men on the sunk CVs, they were predominantly ships crew NOT aviators except on the Hiryu.

The loss of aircraft was serious. IJN had not had enough planes manufactured and the losses in the Hawaiian Island operation and other operations leading up to the Battle of Midway had absorbed all the spares and more. The damage control crews were largely wiped out on all the sunk ships.

Unlike USN the IJN crews were not cross trained for damage control. For the most part it was a specialty.

 

One of the things that made Admiral Yamamoto's prediction about 6 months real had to do with the size of the Japanese empire and the fact that the Army and the IJN didn't really work together. It is a rarely known fact that the Army actually had its own not only its own aircraft (not rarely known) but ships including aircraft carriers. But oil was the biggest problem they would face.

They lacked a mechanically inclined population to recruit sailors etc from.

[Badger Mountain Charlie SASS #43172]

Regardless of the players, when they dropped two A bombs, it was over.

 

Japan did not know how many they had, and Japan could not afford to lose a

city a day.

[Chantry]

Regardless of the players, when they dropped two A bombs, it was over.

 

Japan did not know how many they had, and Japan could not afford to lose a

city a day.

 

I'd have to disagree, based on what I have read there were a number of senior people in the government that were perfectly willing to continue the war no matter what the cost and that it was only the intervention of the Japanese emperor that led to the surrender.

[Badger Mountain Charlie SASS #43172]

That is true. However the reality of losing a city a day would have caused even the military to to realize that they could not win. When Germany folded their tent Japan took note of that. They had lost most of their islands in the outer Pacific and the Phillipines and Okinawa were gone. China was a distant memory the only thing left was the home Island. The Emperor had no other choice. I am not certain that if atomic warfare was indeed waged, that they Japanese people would have not risen against the military and rebelled. The Emperor was the key however.

 

Remember, very few people knew what the Atomic bomb represented. I am certain that those that received the destruction had no idea either of what it was or where it came from.

[S. Quentin Quale, Esq. SASS 9953]

That is true. However the reality of losing a city a day would have caused even the military to to realize that they could not win. When Germany folded their tent Japan took note of that. They had lost most of their islands in the outer Pacific and the Phillipines and Okinawa were gone. China was a distant memory the only thing left was the home Island. The Emperor had no other choice. I am not certain that if atomic warfare was indeed waged, that they Japanese people would have not risen against the military and rebelled. The Emperor was the key however.

 

Remember, very few people knew what the Atomic bomb represented. I am certain that those that received the destruction had no idea either of what it was or where it came from.

 

Actually I think senior Japanese officials had a fair idea of what had happened. The Japanese scientific establishment knew about the theories of Einstien and had received at least some intelligence from the Germans on the building of a nuclear device. There's also the question of espionage. Stalin, through a very sophisticated network of agents, knew almost as much as Truman did about the Manhattan Project (and probably a lot more before Truman became president). It is quite possible that Japan had turned one or more Russian agents. They certainly had a motivation to do so on general political subjects (like whether Russia would enter the War against them).

 

What the Japanese did not know was that we only had three bombs and after Nagasaki there were all used up. We would make more, but that would take time.

 

There was an attempt at a coup to prevent the surrender at the 11th hour and it had a chance of success. Fortunately it failed.

 

Yamamoto was a good commander, but he was very fond of very detailed and complex plans (as was the entire Japanese high command). The most successful was the attack on Pearl Harbor (and subsequent moves against other targets). The Midway operation was a complete failure. If he had survived I'm not sure he might not have been forced to commit sepuku after the fall of the Mariannas. He had not really had a success in months and the price of failure for a Japanese senior officer was often death by his own hand.

 

Midway was a real triumph for ADM Nimitz and his forces.

 

SQQ

[Subdeacon Joe]

Actually I think senior Japanese officials had a fair idea of what had happened. The Japanese scientific establishment knew about the theories of Einstien and had received at least some intelligence from the Germans on the building of a nuclear device.

 

 

There is pretty good evidence that Japan was well along with an atomic bomb project and may have actually tested a device.

 

See: http://www.reformation.org/atlanta-constitution.html

 

 

and: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20060804a2.html

[Hacker, SASS #55963]

Interesting. But the question I have is does the information in the aforementioned articles pass technical muster by folks that have built nuclear devices.

 

On the issue of Yamamoto, I believe that he enjoyed the respect of many Japanese (not the army).

The battle of Midway and its surrounding operations including the aleutians capture created a very complex scenario that forced Vice Admiral Nagumo to have an almost impossible mission. Of course Nagumo was not as skilled when it came to naval aviation tactics as he should have been. The reason I mention Nagumo is that the failure of IJN at Midway was squarely on Nagumo's shoulders for the failure. He was given orders to keep his planes available to perform the complex function yet he failed to follow those orders. Yamamoto never really respected or trusted Nagumo.

Nagumo was given command of the Kido Butai because of rank and time in grade vs skill in the area of specialty. He was known for cruiser fighting and torpedo tactics more than any skills in the area of Naval aviation. Both Ozawa and Yamaguchi were more skilled in the technical aspects of Naval Aviation. But both were junior to Nagumo.

 

SQQ is right about the number of bombs that the US made.

 

But about the Hawaiian island operation (which the name that the Japanese knew of what most Americans call the attack on Pearl Harbor), it was a tactical success for the Japanese but a strategic failure for same.

It brought the neutral US into the war, Helped the US Navy decide how to fight the war (CV based) and Nagumo failed to destroy the US Carriers, the fleet resupply facilities, and fleet repair facilities. All things considered it was a Japanese defeat. The 8 US BBs present only 2 failed to appear later in the war. The AZ and OK would not see action again. MD, TN and PA would return within months, NV would be a year or so and CA and WV wouldn't be until 1944. The US was galvanized against the Axis powers. Pearl functioned as a forward fleet base for the entire war.

[Subdeacon Joe]

Interesting. But the question I have is does the information in the aforementioned articles pass technical muster by folks that have built nuclear devices.

 

 

The first link, about Japan possibly detonating a device, I would call somewhat questionable.

 

But the notebooks and the information in them are the real deal. They had the theory. They were separating U²³⁵, they were producing heavy water. They had the theory, what they didn't have, or likely didn't have, was the industry to build the facilities to produce the quantities of Uranium or Plutonium needed.

[Badger Mountain Charlie SASS #43172]

The airforce was bombing Japan on a daily basis. The ability of recovery from that was not easily achieved.

True that we only had two bombs, but I doubt that Stalin or Japan knew that. As far as they were concerned, we could be involved in a mass production of them. Everything else we did overwhelmed their ability to

reciprocate. When Germany dropped out of the war, that freed up a lot of equipment and men.

 

On the other side of the coin, America was getting tired of the war, the rationing, and the body count. I personally believe that the holdout on the part of the military of Japan was in part refusal to give in, and in part to perhaps negotiate better peace terms. One thing for sure, the Japanese looked at life a lot differently than the Americans did.

[Hacker, SASS #55963]

BMC according to reports on japanese preparedness to repel Operation Downfall, They were well prepared.

Plenty of planes, fuel, and munitions all hidden from US recon. They would have kicked us soundly.

But fuel supplies were extremely limited. The allies certainly would have prevailed. But it might not have been until 1947 or so, perhaps later.

What would have been more interesting is to see what they would have done if the Emperor had not surrendered and the forces in Japan were beaten but those in China and Manchuria needed to be defeated. Those forces were plenty strong.

And Russia was not real happy about facing down Japan.

 

By the way BMC the US did build 3 bombs. One perhaps not a air launched bomb was expended at Trinity, A uranium bomb named "little boy" was expended at Hiroshima carried and dropped by Enola Gay, and a Plutonium bomb named "fat man" carried and dropped by Bockscar on Nagasaki.

[Subdeacon Joe]

BMC according to reports on japanese preparedness to repel Operation Downfall, They were well prepared.

Plenty of planes, fuel, and munitions all hidden from US recon. They would have kicked us soundly.

But fuel supplies were extremely limited. The allies certainly would have prevailed. But it might not have been until 1947 or so, perhaps later.

What would have been more interesting is to see what they would have done if the Emperor had not surrendered and the forces in Japan were beaten but those in China and Manchuria needed to be defeated. Those forces were plenty strong.

And Russia was not real happy about facing down Japan.

 

 

Plus the civilian population was being trained to attack with spears, knives, grenades, almost any weapon they could come by.

 

Depending on which estimates you like, Allied casualties, injured and killed, were projected from 50,000 to over 1,000,000 if Japan were invaded (90 day operation). Japanese losses were projected to be from about 500,000 to 5,000,000, again depending on which set of numbers you like. Possibly as high as 10,000,000 depending on how hard the civilian population fought.

 

Basically, the USMC was written off in just about every projection. Just enough left to secure a landing point for the Army. Personally, I think that if there had been an Allied invasion of Japan, the Army and what was left of the Marine Corps would have been so pissed off that they would have made what Rome did to Carthage look like urban renewal.

[Badger Mountain Charlie SASS #43172]

BMC according to reports on japanese preparedness to repel Operation Downfall, They were well prepared.

Plenty of planes, fuel, and munitions all hidden from US recon. They would have kicked us soundly.

But fuel supplies were extremely limited. The allies certainly would have prevailed. But it might not have been until 1947 or so, perhaps later.

What would have been more interesting is to see what they would have done if the Emperor had not surrendered and the forces in Japan were beaten but those in China and Manchuria needed to be defeated. Those forces were plenty strong.

And Russia was not real happy about facing down Japan.

 

By the way BMC the US did build 3 bombs. One perhaps not a air launched bomb was expended at Trinity, A uranium bomb named "little boy" was expended at Hiroshima carried and dropped by Enola Gay, and a Plutonium bomb named "fat man" carried and dropped by Bockscar on Nagasaki.

 

It is well documented that Harry Truman did not want the Million + casualties that the invasion was projected to produce. I was not aware of the third bomb, but I was aware that the two were produced and

almost rushed into combat before the ink was dry.

The mind set of the Japanese was such that to die for the emperor was expected of you. I suspect that we would have seen knives, stick arrows and anything else that could be used to inflict damage on the "invaders". Look at the few survivors in the island campaigns where large numbers of troops were landed and Japan could not resupply. When the shooting was over, there were mere handfuls of survivors.

[Sorrowful Saul, SASS #47778]

On August 9th 1945, the Soviets launched operation "August Storm". Around 1.5 million Soviet troops drove into Manchuria and in 10 days destroyed the Japanese Kwantung Army. Japan lost almost 700,000 men, killed and captured, to the assault. The Soviets had 32,000 casualties.

[Subdeacon Joe]

I was not aware of the third bomb, but I was aware that the two were produced and

almost rushed into combat before the ink was dry.

 

 

 

Sure you were. The one that was tested at Alamogordo and the two used on Japan. Most people don't connect them all.

[Four-Eyed Buck,SASS #14795]

Back to Midway. Realize that by mid October '42, the Enterprise was the only Midway carrier left, and she was in pretty rough shape from two slug fests off Guadal involving other Japanese carriers. the Essex's were still some months off, and the Saratoga seemed to attract Jap torpedos like a magnet. The Enterprise had to hold the line until relieved to go home for refit..........

[Abilene Slim SASS 81783]

Back to Midway. Realize that by mid October '42, the Enterprise was the only Midway carrier left, and she was in pretty rough shape from two slug fests off Guadal involving other Japanese carriers. the Essex's were still some months off, and the Saratoga seemed to attract Jap torpedos like a magnet. The Enterprise had to hold the line until relieved to go home for refit..........

Saratoga served throughout the war but was ignominiously destroyed in the Bikini Atoll atom bomb tests. Too bad.

[Subdeacon Joe]

Back to Midway. Realize that by mid October '42, the Enterprise was the only Midway carrier left, and she was in pretty rough shape from two slug fests off Guadal involving other Japanese carriers. the Essex's were still some months off, and the Saratoga seemed to attract Jap torpedos like a magnet. The Enterprise had to hold the line until relieved to go home for refit..........

 

All true. But we DID have the Essex class on the ways. How many did Japan have on the ways? And how fast could she produce them?

 

From Wikipedia, Allied and Axis production numbers:

 

Aircraft carriers 155 - 16

Battleships 13 - 7

Cruisers 82 - 15

Destroyers 814 - 86

Convoy escorts 1,102 - 0

Submarines 422 - 1,336

Merchant shipping tonnage 33,993,230 - 5,000,000+

[DocWard]

Saratoga served throughout the war but was ignominiously destroyed in the Bikini Atoll atom bomb tests. Too bad.

 

USS Enterprise, the ship that "held the line" and fought from beginning to end, was sold as scrap, despite attempts to memorialize her.

[Four-Eyed Buck,SASS #14795]

I think the only piece of her they saved is the nameplate from her stern. Not sure where it is, maybe Annapolis

[DocWard]

I think the only piece of her they saved is the nameplate from her stern. Not sure where it is, maybe Annapolis

 

http://www.cv6.org/remember/rivervale.htm

[Four-Eyed Buck,SASS #14795]

Doc, I did some checking after I posted that and found that, and her bell is at Annapolis

[DocWard]

Doc, I did some checking after I posted that and found that, and her bell is at Annapolis

 

Cool. Its rightful place, as far as I'm concerned.

[Chantry]

It's interesting how much of the battle's outcome depended on two almost trivial events that could not have been predicted:

 

1. The Japanese scout plane that launched late and did not report carriers in it's first contact report. This led to Nagumo's indecisiveness, which led to the armed and fueled aircraft sitting on the decks, along with the bombs not returned to the magazines in the rush to rearm for an anti ship strike, when the US dive bombers arrived overhead.

 

2. The separation of the US torpedo planes and the dive bombers, instead of the combined strike that was planned. The arrival of the US torpedo planes before the dive bombers and their sacrifice drew all of the Japanese fighter planes flying combat air patrol down to sea level, which allowed the dive bombers to attack the carriers with minimal or no interference from the Japanese fighters.

[Hacker, SASS #55963]

Chantry, The scout plane #4 IIRC that launched late actually deviated his flight path and found the American Task force. Had he not changed path he might not have seen the American Task Force at all. (I have read that it was actually TF 16 that he saw while another report says TF 17.)

But scout plane #4 was NOT a failure it actually helped the japanese and thus it is one of the myths that "Shattered Sword" debunks about the Battle of Midway.

 

On the separation of TBDs and SBDs the TBDs were largely destroyed to a plane, very few survived. It was normal procedure at the time for TBDs to stay low and SBDS and F4Fs to go high. Poor radio performance and extreme plane range at the time of the attack meant that the attacks were not coordinated. But the separation in timing was enough for the Jap fighters to have regain altitude had they been so inclined to intercept the SBDs. The japanese did not have a cap system that really worked. Each carrier contributed planes to the cap but they did use radar to direct them. They used the big guns of the escorting warships to direct the fighters against TBDs. They did not have very good means of spotting high altitude planes until the attack began. The Kido Butai had been surprised by British bombers in the Indian Ocean a few months earlier. The bombers were detected only when the bombs spashed into the water near the jap warships. A wee bit too late! But the japs feared torpedoes way more than dive bombers. They had very poor damage control policies and procedures.

[Four-Eyed Buck,SASS #14795]

IIRC, That scout plane had a radio failure, too. The TBD's were obsolete by Midway, way underpowered for the loads they carried. Being slower, they had to launch first, making co-ordination very difficult.

It was a destroyer heading back after Nautilus's attack on Soryu that gave the dive bombers the chance to find the fleet carriers.So, different unit's of the Navy actually complimented each other allowing for the successful attack by the Dauntless squadrons. almost my favorite shipboard aircraft of the types used by the Navy in WW II. There was one being restored up by me at the A-C airport bak in the 90's. They ended up selling it to another museum someplace down south. Big regret of mine not getting up there before she was gone

[Hacker, SASS #55963]

IIRC, TBDS while obsolete were typically launched last as they needed the longest length of deck. This confounded the concept of a unified strike.

Combining the underpowered TBD with its heavy (and oft useless torpedo) and the TBDs inability to climb meant that the planes would never really coordinate a strike without some more extreme efforts.

The Yorktown strike with a single SBD squadron and a TBD squadron and minimal fighter escort was a bit better timed but the TBDS went after Hiryu not Soryu as the SBDs did.

 

Of course the greatest absentee act was that of that of the Hornet Air Group under the lack of leadership of Stanhope Cotton Ring.

The Hornet perhaps should have stayed in port for all the good it did. No hits. TBDs lost, half a SBD squadron lost and half the F4Fs lost.

[Four-Eyed Buck,SASS #14795]

No combat experience for the Hornet air wing would probably explain it. I believe the Doolittle raid was her first sortee with her and the Enterprise getting back just in time to be sent out for Midway.

The TBD's were definately no match for the Japanese carrier fighters and no match up for their torpedo bmbers either. Add in an unreliable torpedo and you've got the makings of a disaster. Our subs had fish problems until late '42-early '43. Took Lockwood and Christy working on their own hook to sort the problems out since the Buord wouldn't. Faulty depth mechanisms and unreliable exploders were a major factor and more than likely contributed to some boats being lost

[Hacker, SASS #55963]

A better explanation for why Hornet's airgroup went off in the boonies and missed the engagement is that Capt Mitscher (newly approved for promotion to Rear Admiral) sent HAG looking for a 2nd group of Japanese carriers. Members of Nimitz staff suggested erroneously that the Jap carriers may be working in more than one group. (They weren't!) Interestingly enough HAG submitted a single action report for the Hornet. Not the CV, AG, each squadron report. As required by standard naval procedures. Even though VT8 was completely destroyed. (Sole survivor Ens George Gay wouldn't be found for a while.) Stanhope Ring went along with it apparently and didn't lead it very well.

 

Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance (Cmdr TF-16) basically wrote about the Hornets action report that it was suspect and that TF-16 report by Spruance and his staff should be taken as fact. The Hornet action report shows the path of the HAG wondering around the pacific. While another report made later suggests a more linear path that simple missed the Kido Butai. There was conflict within HAG between CHG and Cmdr VT-8 about the path. VT-8 found and unsuccessfully attacked the Kido Butai while the rest of HAG FAILED to locate Kido Butai and lost some 25 - 30 % of the planes. (many crew were rescued)

 

 

The TBDs should have been retired in say 1940.

Torpedo planes with excess crew were of course a waste of capacity. Look at the design elements of the AD-1 Skyraider. One pilot, no gunner, no excess baggage. Attack aircraft depends upon fighter escort for protection. No matter what happens the defensive guns on a bomber or attack aircraft do not prevent the bomber from being shotdown by enemy fighters. Guns provide no defense against flak nor SAMs.

Best options are to carry more armor, fuel and ordnance.

[Four-Eyed Buck,SASS #14795]

Well, yes and no. With the TBD's they definately couldn't defend themselves, speed and manueverability wise, even empty( ordinance gone). The Dauntless was another thing. They were used as fighter screen at Coral Sea( see Swede Vejtasa) and were fairly effective against bombers and torpedo planes. forward firing twin guns( .50 or .30, not sure), rear firing twin .30's. without heavy ordinance, they were much more manueverable.....Buck