Challenger: The Final Flight

[Cypress Sun]

Challenger: The Final Flight is a four part series on Netflix. Each segment is about 45 minutes long. It is more of a documentary about the reasons for the mission, the risks involved in a cold weather launch and the aftermath of the disaster. Although much of the material is well documented, it is worth a watch for people interested in space travel. 

 

 

[Utah Bob #35998]

In a leadership class we studied the Challenger incident extensively in reference to organizational culture and leadership failures. Never should have happened.

[Trailrider #896]

If you want the whole story, read "Truth, Lies, and O-rings" by Alan J. McDonald, who was in charge of the Morton-Thiokol SRB's for the Shuttle Program at the time of the Challenger disaster. When he and his chief engineer objected to launching with cold conditions for which the boosters had not been certified, he was told by the NASA program manager from Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to, "Stop thinking like and engineer and start thinking like a manager!" That individual at MSFC was the individual to whom the SRB Decelerator Subsystem contractor also reported. (We had nothing to do with the failure, and, as a matter of  fact, the structure that pulled out the main parachutes and was lowered to the ocean by the drogue parachute of the lefthand booster, were the only thing recovered that could have been reused. Non-fatal leakage of the O-rings in the booster in two previous flights was in the downstage postflight reports, which was not within our contract's cognisants, and so we never read them until after the accident.  There wouldn't have been anything we could have done had we read them!  )  That individual at Marshall, whom I will not name here, should, IMO, have gone to prison, or in some countries would have been sent to a gulag or worse!    His reasoning for pushing ahead with the launch was "the schedule"!

 

The arrogance of NASA management allegedly also contributed to the loss of Columbia, when the NASA engineers, who discussed asking the Air Force to photograph the left wing of Columbia, were allegedly essentially browbeaten into not making the request. 

 

"You don't get medals for on-time failures!" -- Walt Williams, NACA/NASA pioneer.

[Hardpan Curmudgeon SASS #8967]

Not easy reading, but more details here:   

 

https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm

 

 

[Utah Bob #35998]

As a friend of mine said, “There’s plenty of bale to go around here”

[Cyrus Cassidy #45437]

But I refuse to watch anything from the child porn service known as Netflix. 

[Abilene Slim SASS 81783]

The launch had been delayed a number of times. I still remember Dan Rather announcing after one of them, "Another black eye for NASA today..." Thanks, Dan.

[Smokin Gator SASS #29736]

I remember reading about Richard Feynmans part in the investigation after the disaster. The managers estimated a 1 in 100,000 chance of catastrophic failure vs 1 in 50 to 1 in 200 by engineers.  He faulted them for giving the unrealistic safety chances in particular to a civilian, Christa McAuliffe, instead of the real risk involved.

[Trailrider #896]

I was going to add more thoughts and information to the discussion, but my blood pressure won't stand for it! 

[Sixgun Sheridan]

22 hours ago, Trailrider #896 said:

The arrogance of NASA management allegedly also contributed to the loss of Columbia, when the NASA engineers, who discussed asking the Air Force to photograph the left wing of Columbia, were allegedly essentially browbeaten into not making the request. 

 

When it was revealed that pieces of foam insulation from the main fuel tank fell off on pretty much every mission NASA basically shrugged their shoulders and accepted that it was unpreventable. I would certainly call that arrogance as well.

[Sedalia Dave]

7 hours ago, Sixgun Sheridan said:

 

When it was revealed that pieces of foam insulation from the main fuel tank fell off on pretty much every mission NASA basically shrugged their shoulders and accepted that it was unpreventable. I would certainly call that arrogance as well.

 

There was a firm belief that the foam would not cause any significant damage to the Shuttle. I attended a briefing of the accident investigation by an admiral and engineer that were present during the test and when the foam blew a hole in the replica wing the entire room was so quiet you could hear your own heart beat. No one in the room thought that the foam could really do that much damage. 

[DeaconKC]

We just finished the Challenger series. Very well done.

[Big Sage, SASS #49891 Life]

I worked on the Shuttle Program from the beginning at Rockwell (AKA North American Aviation). I was responsible for the build of the Aft Fuselage> I also was Project Manager for the design and production of it. It was well known among management at our company about the attitude of senior NASA Managers. Both Shuttle losses were preventable, but the contractors took the hit. After the Columbia loss, I finally had enough and left after 18 years. Spent the next 22 years at Northrop......well away from NASA!

[Sixgun Sheridan]

16 hours ago, Sedalia Dave said:

There was a firm belief that the foam would not cause any significant damage to the Shuttle. I attended a briefing of the accident investigation by an admiral and engineer that were present during the test and when the foam blew a hole in the replica wing the entire room was so quiet you could hear your own heart beat. No one in the room thought that the foam could really do that much damage. 

 

I remember hearing that. Funny thing, but when they do the hydroplane races each summer they have to make sure there's no trash floating around on the track area, because at the speeds they're going even a plastic Coke bottle can punch right through a fiberglass hydroplane hull. You'd have thought that NASA would've realized that even a piece of foam can act like a cannonball when it comes off at 5,000mph.

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